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Introduction 
 
 
The CSDP after the December Summit 
To Rebalance, the EU Should Focus Less on Missions and More on 
Security and Defence Cooperation 
Nicolai von Ondarza and Marco Overhaus 
In December 2013 the heads of state and government for the first time in five years 
dedicated their European Council summit mainly to the Common Security and Defence 
Policy. In the run-up to the meeting there was no shortage of piecemeal proposals for 
enhancing the effectiveness of the CSDP and strengthening military capabilities and the 
European defence industry. What has been lacking is an overarching vision of where the 
CSDP should be heading and how individual reform initiatives should be prioritised. 
For sure, the European Council did not provide such a vision but instead decided on a 
number of follow-on processes. These now need to be exploited to the fullest possible 
extent in order to create a new foundation for the CSDP, which should be shifted away 
from crisis management towards European security and defence cooperation. 
 
The European External Action Service 
(EEAS) and the European Union’s national 
governments have come to define success 
and failure of the CSDP almost exclusively 
in terms of the sheer number of civilian 
and military missions (to date 30 completed 
or ongoing missions). This logic has led to 
the initiation or continuation of interven-
tions whose security value is dubious, such 
as the operation to secure the airport in 
Juba in South Sudan or the two missions to 
reform the security sector in the Democ-
ratic Republic of the Congo. Eleven of the 
seventeen ongoing CSDP operations have 
fewer than two hundred staff and are large-
ly symbolic in terms of their effectiveness. 
A one-sided focus on crisis management 
is no longer enough to legitimise and justi-
fy the CSDP. Three political developments 
have to be taken into account in this regard. 
Firstly, European and Western interven-
tionism has fallen into crisis. Large sections 
of the European Union’s populations and 
even governments have withdrawn their 
support for voluntary interventions in far-
off conflicts. This is not only a matter of 
opinion polls; in August 2013 the British 
lower house rejected a military interven-
tion in Syria, a sphere of great relevance 
for Europe. 
Secondly, the Security and Defence 
Policy is not given high priority at the Euro-
pean Union level or in the member states. 
That is not in itself a new fact, as this policy 
sphere long ago lost its centrality for the 
existence of the nation, and is in that sense 
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no longer central to the national interest. 
The enormous political and financial 
efforts required to tackle the financial and 
debt crisis have further shifted priorities, 
resulting in deep – and uncoordinated – 
defence cuts in most member states. 
Thirdly, hopes that CSDP operations 
would gradually cause the security and 
defence perspectives of the EU member 
states to converge have not been fulfilled. 
On the contrary, even ten years after the 
first CSDP mission a shared European 
“strategic culture” is nowhere in sight. 
A Reorientation of the CSDP 
The European Council summit of December 
2013 was therefore staged as a turning point 
for the CSDP by Council President Herman 
Van Rompuy. For more than a year in its 
run-up, the “defence summit” served as a 
focal point for member states and EU actors 
like High Representative Catherine Ashton 
or the European Defence Agency (EDA) 
which prepared numerous piecemeal pro-
posals, for example to slim down the plan-
ning and decision-making structures or to 
establish a number of capability develop-
ment projects such as in the area of 
unmanned drones. 
In sum, however, the long awaited con-
clusions of the “defence summit” amount 
to exactly that – a political message that 
“defence matters” followed by a list of often 
technical and institutional improvements. 
At the same time it falls short of achieving 
the fundamental reorientation that the EU 
security and defence policy needs. However, 
the European Council left a host of difficult 
questions explicitly open – notably capa-
bility planning, CSDP funding and the EU 
Battlegroups – to be decided in the near 
and medium future. 
These open discussions should be used 
to shift the focus of CSDP from operations 
to security and defence cooperation. Essen-
tially, the ability of individual groups of 
member states to act jointly must be pre-
served or strengthened, and at the same 
time integrated into a European frame-
work: “deploy less, but able to deploy 
more” should be the motto. 
Specifically, three areas should be ad-
dressed: the instruments and processes 
of the CSDP in general, the EU’s rapid 
response capabilities and its strategic 
priorities. 
The CSDP as Insurance 
Firstly, the true core of security and defence 
policy – the idea of protection against (ex-
ternal) threats and challenges – should be 
returned to the centre of attention. This 
includes a rigorous examination of the 
effectiveness of CSDP operations to date 
and the possibility of ending ongoing 
missions. A military or civilian EU engage-
ment should only be considered when the 
interests of several EU states are clearly af-
fected and the Union has a realistic option 
for making an effective contribution to 
crisis response. 
However, it will not always be possible to 
organise joint capabilities from all twenty-
eight member states simultaneously. The 
European Council acknowledged this by 
promoting increased flexibility in capabil-
ity development. It does not, however, lend 
impetus on the question of how to coordi-
nate common European interest and the 
increase in regional “islands of coopera-
tion” created through bottom-up engage-
ment by some member states. 
To retain the joint outlook on this co-
operation the EU institutions – EEAS and 
EDA – should therefore strengthen these 
“clusters”. This would allow states with 
similar positions on security and defence 
questions to cooperate more closely within 
the joint EU framework; for example, the 
northern member states, the Franco-British 
tandem, or the Visegrád Group. 
Suitable instruments for this coordina-
tion would be the development of joint 
security scenarios and contingency plan-
ning in the EEAS, the creation of transpar-
ency in defence planning through the EU 
Military Committee, and joint training 
measures and exercises supported by the 
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EDA. Joint funding of military CSDP oper-
ations (Athena mechanism) and the EU 
budget for civilian missions should support 
this, for example by providing funds for 
exercises. Here, the defence summit also 
offers a window of opportunity, as EU lead-
ers tasked the High Representative and 
EDA to develop an EU policy framework 
for capability planning by the end of 2014. 
This should be aligned as closely as possible 
with the existing NATO planning process. 
In addition to organising regional clusters, 
the EU could also add value through syn-
ergies with other planning processes (such 
as the European Semester for budget plan-
ning) and with the civilian sphere. 
Battlegroups and the European Union’s 
Crisis Response 
The development of European capabilities, 
in particular the EU Battlegroups (BGs), 
was another major issue in the run-up to 
the December 2013 Council. The BGs, intro-
duced in 2004 by France and the United 
Kingdom, are still one-sidedly configured 
for very rapid deployment exclusively with-
in the EU framework. The existing concept 
for the Battlegroups provides for high 
standby readiness (deployment within five 
to ten days) in combination with a rather 
rigid rotation principle. Both have proven 
problematic. Moreover, the experiences of 
Mali and Libya demonstrate that in acute 
crisis situations large individual nations 
such as France prefer to act alone or in 
small coalitions. They shy away from multi-
lateral coordination processes when plan-
ning and preparing such operations. 
The European Council endorsed some 
of the many reform proposals that were 
tabled beforehand, specifically with respect 
to making the Battlegroups more flexible 
and deployable. Already in November 
2013 the Council of Foreign and Defence 
Ministers spelled out more detailed pro-
posals on this (including training and 
advice to third countries, streamlining 
exercises and improving certification 
processes). 
While these proposals still need to be 
implemented, the revision of the Battle-
group concept ought to be more ambitious: 
The BG should serve the purpose of estab-
lishing and expanding European crisis 
response capabilities in the member states, 
suitable for deployment in different con-
texts (NATO, European Union, United 
Nations). 
Instead of organising its rapid response 
forces separately – and thus at high cost – 
as battlegroups, the European Union should 
integrate them into military capabilities 
through a stronger functional division of 
labour. Regional clusters – such as between 
countries with special naval capabilities – 
could then cooperate more intensely, for 
example to create rapid response capabili-
ties for fighting piracy or securing shipping 
routes. 
Essentially, the battlegroups need to be 
consolidated in long-term partnerships and 
systematically integrated into pooling and 
sharing initiatives. Smaller member states 
could also be offered material incentives by 
further expanding joint financing for these 
forms of multilateral cooperation. 
Strategic Priorities 
Thirdly, the European Union should make 
another attempt to integrate the CSDP 
into the strategic priorities of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Ever 
since the European Security Strategy (ESS) 
of 2003 the same political dilemma has 
cropped up again and again: Changes in 
the EU’s strategic environment require a 
revision of the ESS but a majority of EU 
decision-makers fear fruitless strategic 
debates would distract from the urgent 
challenges of the CFSP/CSDP. 
There is also concern that a new docu-
ment might fall short of the ESS, due to the 
requirement of consensus. Although High 
Representative Ashton called for a strategic 
review in her report for the defence sum-
mit, the European Council watered this 
down to just tasking the next High Repre-
sentative in rather general terms to report 
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in 2015 on the “impact of changes in the 
global environment”. 
Despite such worries, a strategic and po-
litical framework for the European Union’s 
foreign, security and defence policy re-
mains absolutely necessary, all the more so 
given the increasing importance of regional 
clusters. A joint strategy for security and 
defence remains, like the CFSP, an indispen-
sable frame ensuring that the Union stays 
together on security policy. 
The next High Representative should 
therefore make more than full use of the 
cautious approach of the European Council 
and turn the report on global changes into 
a fully fledged strategic document. This 
document could thus represent the agenda 
for the High Representative’s work on the 
Union’s foreign, security and defence 
policy. 
For sure, preparation of such a docu-
ment should be preceded by as broad a 
process of consultation as possible. How-
ever, a unanimous decision by the heads of 
state and government or the foreign minis-
ters of the member states would, unlike in 
2003, not be required to adopt it. 
This “strategic work programme” could 
thus offer a political framework through 
which the defence cooperation and the 
reorientation of CSDP could be integrated 
into the Union’s external relations. 
Outlook 
The European Council has stated that 
“defence matters”, but offered very few 
decisions to start the reorientation the 
CSDP needs. Mere institutional tweaking 
and piecemeal capacity projects will not 
fundamentally alter the current void in EU 
security and defence policy. To that extent, 
the windows of opportunities opened up by 
the tasks assigned by the Heads of State and 
Government to the various actors of CSDP 
for 2014/2015 should be used to the full 
extent. In this regard, the defence summit 
could still be used as a launch pad for the 
much-needed reform process. 
A “strategic reorientation” of the Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy must be 
achieved: less crisis management and more 
European security and defence cooperation 
between member states. That will neither 
make crisis management obsolete nor lend 
the CSDP a purely military character. In 
future, however, the member states should 
concentrate their energies on a smaller 
number of operations, first and foremost 
in those cases where the European Union 
can really make a meaningful contribution. 
The political deficits – the continuing 
discrepancies between member states and 
the low political priority given to security 
and defence policy – cannot be completely 
overcome. But they have less weight if the 
Union focuses on promoting the ability of 
its members to cooperate: through joint 
contingency planning, the expansion of 
training, exercises and standardisations at 
the European level. In that way the Union 
can both play out its strengths as a coordi-
nating frame and, through the CSDP, in 
the medium term enable Europe to act 
effectively on foreign, security and defence 
policy. 
The proposed shift of priorities in the 
CSDP would also require German decision-
makers to reemphasise some of their 
principles. Firstly, cooperation between 
the European Union and NATO should be 
strengthened. Secondly, in the medium 
term Germany should explore to what 
extent it can function as a framework 
nation for smaller and medium-sized EU 
states. The recent reform of the German 
armed forces offers potential for such a 
role, although that would require Berlin 
to accept and promote regional clusters 
in EU defence cooperation. 
The European Council is set to review 
the progress on the CSDP by mid 2015 at 
the latest. During this time, a step by step 
realignment of the CSDP should bring it 
closer to its original goal of enhancing the 
EU member states’ ability to jointly provide 
security and defence. 
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